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In the Supreme Court
of the
State of Utah
ROBERT H. HINCKLEY, INC.,
a corporation,

Plaintiff,

vs.
STATE TAX COMMISSION OF UTAH,

Defendant.
STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE
This case involves the validity of an assessment for
sales tax and the imposition of penalties and interest upon
such sales tax deficiency, and the interpretation of the Utah
sales tax law as applied to sales of ten cents ( lOc) and less
through vending machines. The deficiency assessment was
upheld by the Tax Commission after a formal hearing, as
was the penalty and interest.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON REVIEW AND
STATEMENT OF FACTS
I. The review sought and the statement of facts are
as set forth in the plaintiff's and defendant's briefs.

2. The amid curiae in this case, who filed this brief
after leave of the Court having been first obtained, are persons and corporations in the business of retailing through
vending machines. Each of said persons and corporations
sells candy, gum, life savers, popcorn, and soft drinks through
these machines, and one of those persons sells fresh apples

and pears by vending machines. A substantial portion of all
of said businesses consists of retail sales of ten cents, or less,
through vending machines in the State of Utah.
ARGUMENT
Point I.
THE UTAH SALES TAX IS A TAX ON THE
VENDEE-CONSUMER.

IT IS NOT NOW A "JOINT

AND SEVERAL" TAX WHICH VENDOR AND VENDEE
ARE

PERMITTED

TO

ALLOCATE

BY

PRIVATE

AGREEMENT, NOR IS IT A TAX ON THE VENDOR.
The legislative history of this act, as set forth in the
plaintiff's brief at page 11, et seq., shows that the sales tax
in effect now and during the time covered by the assessments
in this case is a consumer tax. Cases such as W. F. Jensen
Candy Co. v. State Tax Commission, 90 Utah 350, 61 P.2d
629, and State Tax Commission v. City Commission of Logan,
88 Utah 406, 54 P.2d 1197, a11e not in point because the tax
has been changed to a consumer tax rather than a "permis·
sive" vendee or vendor tax, as was the situation when the
Jensen Candy case was decided.
In addition to the authorities in the plaintiff's brief,
we ask the Court to take judicial notice of the Seventeenth
Biennial Report of the State Tax Commission to the Utah
Legislature, which is filed pursuant to law, and particularly
paragraph 15 thereof which reads as follows:
"15. We respect fully recommend that the sales tax
law be changed to a vendor or retailer type tax rather
than a consumer tax. (Emphasis supplied)
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"There is some confusion as to whether the sales
tax is a consumer tax, but it is generally regarded to
be so. If the act were amended, it would eliminate this
confusion and will make it possible to tax some sales
of personal property which are not now being taxed."
The Tax Commission itself recognizes and administratively construes the present sales tax as a tax on the consumer.
Point II.
THE TAX COMMISSION, BY ITS REGULATIONS,
MAY NOT LAWFULLY CONVERT THE TAX FROM

ONE ON THE CONSUMER TO ONE ON THE SELLER.
It is submitted that this proposition is self-evident and

needs only to be stated to be upheld. The Tax Commission
must take the law from the Legislature and cannot, for administrative convenience or for any other reason, change the
law as enacted by the legislative branch of the government.
The naked situation in this case is that the Tax Commission, by regulation, is trying to convert the sales tax from a
tax on the consumer to a tax on the seller. This can be the
only theory for the deficiency assessment and resulting
penalties and interest imposed.
We submit that the Tax Commission has no such authority. It can make reasonable rules and regulations to carry
out the legislative intent, but it has no authority to change
the entire theory and purpose of the tax and defeat the purpose and intent of the Legislature. Section 59-15-20, U.C.A.
\ 1953); E. C. Olsen Co. v. State Tax Commission, 109 Utah
563, 168 P. 2d 324 ( 1946); 'and authorities cited at page 28
of plaintiff's brief.
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If the _Tax Commission is allowed to convert this tax
from a tax on the consumer (as the Legislature established
it) to one on the seller, in ten cent and less sales, the legislative purpose is perverted - including its manifest desire
to have the consumer know that he is paying the tax and
how much that tax is, as recognized and required by Tax
Commission rules.
The Tax Commission's Regulation 74 attempting to im·
pose a "gross receipts" tax on vending machine vendors in
lieu of the statutory sales tax on the vendee is outside the
authority and jurisdiction of the Tax Commission, is uncon·
stitutional, and void.
Point III.
UNDER THE LAW AND VALID REGULATIONS
NO TAX IS COLLECTIBLE ON SALES OF TEN CENTS
OR LESS, AND THE VENDOR AS COLLECTING
AGENT IS NOT LIABLE TO REMIT TAXES NOT
COLLECTIBLE OR COLLECTED FROM THE VENDEE·
CONSUMER.
The seller is the collecting agent; and, in those cases
where he can lawfully and practically collect the tax from
the consumer, he has the duty to collect that tax and pay it
to the State Tax Commission. If he does not perform that
duty he is penalized by having to pay the tax himself because
of the dereliction of his duty to collect, not because the tax
is imposed upon the seller. This is the import of the follow·
ing cases cited by the Tax Commission as authorities for the
proposition that the tax is imposed on the seller:
Ralph Child Construction Co. v. State Tax Commission,
12 Utah 2d 53, 362 P. 2d 422 (1961)
4

E. C. Olsen Co. v. State Tax Commission 109 Utah 563
'
'
168 P. 2d 324 (1964)
Dupler's Art Furs, Inc. v. State Tax Commission, 108
Utah 513, 161 P. 2d 788 (1945)
State Tax Commission v. Spanish Fork, 99 Utah 177,
100 P. 2d 575 ( 1940)
The question in the case now before the Court is: Does
the seller have to pay the tax himself in those instances where
it is either unlawful or, as a practical matter, impossible for
that seller to collect the tax from the consumer?
This question has not been before the Court before because all previous cases have either involved the law which
imposed the tax on the transaction, with the seller having the
option to collect or not from the consumer (such as the Jensen
Candy case), or they involved cases where the seller could
have collected the tax, but did not.
On sales of ten cents or less, the seller cannot practically
or lawfully collect a sales tax from the consumer. This is
because there are no tokens or money less than one cent, and
because of Tax Commission Regulations (Local Sales Tax
Regulation No. 3, 1961) and State law (Section 59-15-5,
U.C.A., 1953), which make it unlawful for a seller to collect
any tax on a sale of less than fourteen cents ( 14c), where
the tax at the authorized rate is less than one-half cent. So
in this case it is both illegal and impossible for the seller to
act as the collector of this tax.
Under this statute the vendor-collector is required only
to remit "the amount of tax herein required to be collected
by the vendor ... ". The statute does require that "the vendor shall collect the tax from the vendee, but in no case shall
he collect as tax an amount (without regard to fractional
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parts of one cent) in excess of the tax computed at the rates
prescribed· by this act." Applying the proper rule of strict
statutory construction of a tax statute, the Tax Commission.
by its Local Sales Tax Regulation No. 3, has properly and
administratively construed this Statute as excluding the collection of tax where the amount of the tax at the proper rate
is less than one-half cent. Any other construction leads to
the absurdity of collecting a 100 % tax of one cent on a penny
sale of gum. Where the prQPer tax rate applied to the sale
price results in a tax of less than one-half cent it is clear
that the Legislature and the Tax Commission intended that
the tax should be waived as uncollectible. This is the only
common-sense conclusion.
Under this circumstance the seller is not breaching any
duty, or any statutory obligation imposed upon him, in his
failure to collect and remit the tax. Thus, the rule in the
cases relied upon by the Tax Commission does not apply
because there is no breach of a duty by the seller.
The Tax Commission in its brief implies that the plain·
tiff desires the Court to hold sales of ten cents or less are
not "subject to sales tax". This is misleading. It appears to
us that all retail sales, other than those expressly exempt
(which sales are not here involved), are "subject to the sales
tax". However, the Legislature and the Tax Commission by
its regulations have made it so that the seller cannot lawfully,
and as a practical matter it cannot, collect that tax from the
consumer on sales of ten cents or less. If tokens were re·
established, or if there were a coin smaller than one cent, it
would be possible to collect the tax on such sales. But in the
absence of tokens or some other practical device there is no
way a consumer tax can be collected from the consumer on
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a ten cent or less sale with the present tax rate. As no tax
can be collected, the collector is not required to remit tax.
This is just an application of the familiar maxim that the
law does not require the impossible. Where performance of
a duty is impossible, non-performance is excused, and ordinary penalties for non-performance are suspended. This is
ordinary, basic justice. It is implicit in the statute and is
the basis of the entire "bracket" system excusing the consumer-taxpayer from paying tax amounting to less than onehalf cent.
CONCLUSION
The tax here involved is on the consumer. The vendor
is merely the collector of that tax, with the obligation to
pay the tax himself if he fails to perform his duty of collection in those situations where he can lawfully and practically
make the collection. He has no duty to do the impossible
or unlaw Jul. In this case the seller has not failed to perform
its duty to collect the tax because it could not lawfully and
it could not as a practical matter collect the tax from the
consumer. Since the seller has violated no duty and since
the tax is not imposed upon a seller directly, the assessment
here made and the penalties and interest thereon are invalid
and should be set aside. The attempt by the State Tax Commission to convert this tax from one on the consumer to one
on the seller is invalid, and the seller's obligation to pay the
tax arises only in those cases where he has violated his duty
to collect it.
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Respectfully submitted,
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DANIEL A. ALSUP
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JACK A. RICHARDS
Attorneys for Amici Curiae
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